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Abstract 
 
In the field of corporate governance, the phenomenon of executive compensation is highly 
contentious and receives a great deal of attention. CEO’s have come under extensive scrutiny 
with respect to the ever increasing compensation packages which they receive. In fact, this lies at 
the centre of the Principal-Agent problem where the incentives given to the CEO must be 
structured in such a way the he or she delivers the maximum possible shareholder value. The 
value of these incentives are typically well above that of the average worker, which is where all 
the contention stems from. However, practitioners recognise that being a CEO is a highly 
demanding job where companies are willing to pay top dollar to attract and retain the best.  
The level of CEO Compensation varies depending on region and culture, with much having been 
documented on the issue in Western societies especially. This paper will veer off the traditional 
course and instead examine the phenomenon of CEO pay in the South African context. The 
purpose is to assess how established theories, Western in origin, hold up in an emerging market 
framework.   
Like any researcher, I hope that this will be an insightful experience for myself and that this body 
of work will contribute meaningfully to the existing body of literature in the field of executive 
compensation. 
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Determinants of CEO Compensation in South Africa 
Chapter1: Intoduction 
INTRODUCTION 
South Africa has one of the highest levels of income inequality in the world, and a relatively high 
level of CEO compensation.  Research conducted by P-E Corporate services – a human 
resources agency which tracks CEO remuneration – suggests that the differential between the 
highest and the lowest paid workers in a medium-sized company in South Africa is 55:1.The 
research goes further by stating that South African CEOs enjoy the highest purchasing power 
parity in the world.(http://www.fin24.com/Economy/SA-bosses-best-off-in-the-world-20101126)  
For a country that is burdened with such a high level of inequality, excessive CEO compensation 
is a rather controversial issue. So much so, that in recent weeks the Minister of Economic 
Development – Ebrahim Patel – has even proposed a cap on executive salaries to rectify 
imbalances within society. (http://net-145-057.mweb.co.za/Economy/Business-worried-about-
salary-cap-20101124) 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this research paper is to tease out the significant factors determining what South 
African CEOs are compensated. This compensation package includes basic salary, bonuses and 
equity appropriation. The large body of research on the topic typically cite the following 
explanatory variables:  The structure and composition of the board; characteristics of the CEO 
such as education and experience; Ownership of the firm (family-owned or not?); and the 
performance of the firm. These and other variables will be analysed to answer the research 
question. 
 
Significance of the study 
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Since the dawn of democracy in South Africa, the inequality level has risen consistently. 40% of 
the population is considered to be living in poverty. This is taking place in Africa’s largest 
economy. As stated in the first paragraph, South African CEOs earn exorbitant incomes in this 
environment. It is thus important to look at why these CEOs earn the incomes that they do and 
whether it is justified, especially given the societal context. Also, we would like to determine 
whether government’s proposal to cap the salaries is necessarily a good thing.   
 
Research questions 
Primary question: 
Which elements of the board significantly affect the level of CEO compensation in South Africa? 
 
 
Selection of independent variables 
The body of research conducted on the topic of executive compensation cite several variables 
that may explain the level of compensation. Since the compensation of the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) is determined by the board of directors, the analysis of executive compensation 
will be largely limited to the board and its mechanisms. As a point of departure, the role of the 
board will be disaggregated into smaller, more concise functions. From these sub-functions it 
will then be possible to tease out the relevant explanatory variables for each case. Bøhren and 
Strøm (2010, 1) identify 3 broad areas of interest with respect to the board of directors. The first 
of these areas is to ensure that the interests of principals and agents are sufficiently aligned. The 
Principal-Agent theory will be discussed in Chapter 2. The second purpose of the board is to 
provide advice with respect to the operations of the firm, and to monitor the actions of the 
executive team. Thirdly, it is imperative for the board to operate in a manner that promotes 
effective decision-making. Gender heterogeneity, for instance, could arguably influence the 
board’s ability to find agreement on issues. . Matters pertaining to the board will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 2. To be clear, the study aims to ascertain which board characteristics 
are able to explain the level of compensation given to the CEO. Apart from board matters, the 
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study will determine whether there is a link between the firm’s performance and the CEO’s 
remuneration package. The proxy used for firm performance is the Return on Assets (ROA). In 
addition to the firm’s performance, we will also test whether a relationship exists between the 
size of the firm and CEO compensation. The proxy for firm size is market capitalisation at the 
end of the end of the financial year. 
In order to establish a coherent framework for the explanatory variables, they shall be classed 
into the following categories:  
 Independence and Incentives          
H1: CEO COMPENSATION IS INVERSELY RELATED TO PERCENTAGE OF NON-
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE 
H2: CEO COMPENSATION DECREASES AS THE PROPORTION OF INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTORS INCREASES 
 
H3: WHEN CHAIRPERSON IS EXECUTIVE, CEO COMPENSATION IS HIGHER 
 
H4: WHEN CHAIRPERSON IS FOUNDER, CEO COMPENSATION IS LOWER 
 
H5: CEO COMPENSATION IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO CHAIRPERSON COMPENSATION 
H6: IF THE CHAIRPERSON HAS PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED THE POSITION OF CEO, CEO 
COMPENSATION WILL BE HIGHER 
 
 
 
 
 Performance 
 
H7: CEO COMPENSATION IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO THE FIRM’S RETURN ON ASSETS 
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H8: CEO COMPENSATION IS POSITEIVELY RELATED TO THE SIZE OF THE FIRM 
 
 
 Board composition and diversity 
 
H9: CEO COMPENSATION DECREASES AS THE PROPORTION OF FEMALE DIRECTORS 
INCREASES 
 
H10: CEO COMPENSATION DECREASES AS THE PROPORTION OF BLACK DIRECTORS 
INCREASES 
 
 
H11: CEO COMPENSATION IS POSITEIVELY RELATED TO THE AVERAGE AGE OF THE 
BOARD 
 
H12: CEO COMPENSATION IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO BOARD SIZE  
 
H13: CEO COMPENSATION INCREASES AS THE PROPORTION OF FOREIGN DIRECTORS 
INCREASES 
 
H14: CEO COMPENSATION IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN 
DIRECTORS IN THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE 
 
H15:CEO COMPENSATION IS LOWER WHEN THE CHAIRPERSON IS SOUTH AFRICAN 
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Purpose 
The purpose of this research paper is to tease out the significant factors determining what South 
African CEOs are compensated. This compensation package includes basic salary, bonuses and 
equity appropriation. The large body of research on the topic typically cite the following 
explanatory variables:  The structure and composition of the board; characteristics of the CEO 
such as education and experience; Ownership of the firm (family-owned or not?); and the 
performance of the firm. These and other variables will be analysed to answer the research 
question. 
 
Significance of the study 
Since the dawn of democracy in South Africa, the inequality level has risen consistently. 40% of 
the population is considered to be living in poverty. This is taking place in Africa’s largest 
economy. As stated in the first paragraph, South African CEOs earn exorbitant incomes in this 
environment. It is thus important to look at why these CEOs earn the incomes that they do and 
whether it is justified, especially given the societal context. Also, we would like to determine 
whether government’s proposal to cap the salaries is necessarily a good thing.   
 
Research questions 
Primary question: 
Which elements of the board significantly affect the level of CEO compensation in South Africa? 
Secondary question: 
What is the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation? 
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Research Methods 
The research will be conducted using primary data from annual reports of listed South African 
companies over a five-year period. It will be quantitative in nature and regression analysis will 
be performed using SPSS. The unit of analysis is CEO compensation. Correlations will be 
determined amongst the independent and dependent variables. 
A literature review will also be conducted using journals and relevant secondary sources to 
provide a better understanding of the topic. This section is ideal for teasing out research 
questions and possible explanatory variables. 
 
Outline of thesis 
CHAPTER ONE:    Introduction 
CHAPTER TWO:   2.1.......... Agency Theory 
    2.2.......... Theoretical View on CEO Compensation 
    2.3.......... The Board and its Sub-Committees 
CHAPTER THREE:  3.1...........Contemporary South Africa 
    3.1.1 Apartheid 
    3.2.2 Transformation 
    3.1.3 Black Economic Empowerment 
    3.2............The Regulatory Environment 
    3.2.1 Corporate Governance defined 
    3.2.2 The King codes of governance 
    3.2.3 King II 
    3.2.4 King II and the Board of Directors 
    3.2.5 The King III Report 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  Research Methodology 
CHAPTER FIVE:  Regression Analysis 
CHAPTER SIX:  Summary and Conclusion 
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Determinants of CEO Compensation In South Africa 
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Agency Theory 
Agency Theory is widely used in financial economics. The theory deals with the clash of 
interests among people with dissimilar interests regarding the same assets. The most common 
conflict that can occur is between the shareholders and managers of a company. More than often 
it happens when a company is forced to make such strategic decisions that are seemingly 
damaging for the shareholders. Agency theory deals with such issues.  Another common conflict 
of interest is between the shareholders and debt holders. A riskier approach that can produce 
higher returns for the company can be beneficial for the shareholders but would be detrimental to 
the debt holders. This is because of the reason that a risky strategy will increase the risk of 
default on debt but as the debt holders are given a fixed return only, they would not be able to 
avail the higher returns. 
Agency theory is expressed using many different approaches. Barney and Ouchi (1986) wrote 
that the agency theory defines the affect of capital markets upon a company. This implies that….. 
Jensen and Meckling (1972) insisted that organizations should be considered as a set of implicit 
and explicit contracts with associated rights. Companies cannot be operated without following 
internal or external agreements. In the contracts and agreement, the rights and obligations of 
associates are defined. In managerial power theory, it is defined that directors support the CEOs 
salaries on the basis of internal factors but not on the external factors. The forecasted connection 
between power and pay is mostly supported. However, the relation between power and firm 
performance has mixed support, suggesting that, while the managerial power theory has 
relevance in explaining the relation between power and pay, the scope of power needs to be 
broadened for better understanding of how managerial power affects firm performance (Ashley 
M. Guidroz, Lindsey M. Kotrba, and Daniel R. Denison, 2008).  
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Fama (1980) studied the way to control and direct the individual executive opportunism. He 
emphasized the use of managerial labor market for this purpose.  The problems among agency 
relationships are due to the combination of self assumed autonomy and motivation. The principal 
hires agents to serve their interests, eventually the principals feel that their own interest and that 
of the agents are diverging. In the corporate world, the shareholder of a company is considered 
the principal. The principals hire executives and directors to serve as agents of the company. 
According to Berle and Means (1932) the principal can ensure that his agents serve the 
shareholders interests rather than their own, by separating ownership from control. This theory is 
more focused on the interests of those people who are directly linked with the company.  
In context of this research, the agency problem between the shareholders and the executives of a 
company is relevant here. The interests of a company’s shareholders lie in lower expenses and 
higher profits for the company while the board offers evermore increasing salaries and benefits 
for the executives, thus increasing the overhead expenses of the company. This phenomenon 
creates a gap between two integral parts of a company namely the shareholders and the 
executives. According to Jared Harris (2006) the concept that managers should be offered 
generous incentives in order to enhance a company’s prospect for success has a long history and 
its prevalence reflects that it is a good practice. Jensen and Murphy (1990) called for increased 
CEO compensation via stock options to better align the incentives of executives in an attempt to 
induce a higher level of performance. In the 20 years that have passed since this suggestion was 
made, the concept that executives should be offered high incentive compensations has increased 
in popularity and the ideas behind it is that the earnings of executives should be tied to the 
performance of the company’s share price; this is considered the best way to align the interests of 
shareholders and executives. Within all facets of the business process, the shareholder is always 
exposed to the greed and self interest of the executives unless some contingency steps are taken. 
According to John Roberts (2004) certain agency costs must be accepted by the shareholders in 
the form of incentives and sanctions to align the interests of executives with the shareholders. 
Walsh and Seward (1990) say that in recent decades these assumptions have translated into 
techniques and practices designed to control the performance of executives both inside and 
outside. Executives can be controlled by the board internally by firing them or giving them 
incentives like stock options, performance bonuses, and long-term incentive plans. The board 
must monitor the performance of the executives and decide upon the future strategy impartially 
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and independently without any prejudice. The members of the audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees should be independent non-executives. Only then are the committee 
members in a position to ensure adequate monitoring of the executives’ performance and 
decision-making. The company should be transparent to the outside world in financial, social and 
environmental performances. According to Fama (1980) the intention is to inform the stock 
market about the company’s performance so that the market is better informed about the 
company standing to correctly judge the stock price. Myners (2002) claims that in recent years 
the shareholders have shown concern that they themselves might take responsibility as owners in 
the form of institutional investors. This shows that there is a competition for corporate control in 
the company. 
2.2 Theoretical View on CEO Compensation 
The analysis of CEO Compensation can be governed by strict ethics of distributive justice 
because CEOs should receive the pay according to their skills, size of company and the 
economic condition of the country. In spite of the existence of an underlying principle for the 
declaration of salaries of employees among the corporate world, it is given by officials of the 
company to the all the authorities which are higher than CEOs. The information about 
compensation of CEOs is to be shared because it will help in informing to the society and other 
people about fair or wrong method of CEOs compensation. When the information about CEOs 
compensation will be communicated to the stakeholders that include society, it provides a fair 
chance to each person to do accountability in between performance and compensations. It will 
answer to the question that does that figure make justice with the economic figures of that 
country.  Does that figure is justifiable as per the company’s salary scales. According to an S&P 
500 report for the year 2007 CEO’s in USA have compensations approximately 344 times more 
than the wage of an average worker.  This ratio is much less in South Africa where a CEO earns 
approximately fifty times more than an average employee. 
The compensation or income of the chief executive officer of a company is a topic of great 
debate nowadays. CEO’s level justifies high pay scale because they give their years of 
experience to make profits for the company but it is the right of common people to protest 
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against the right estimation of their salaries. There is a need to tackle the issue by theoretical 
study and research of the matter. The general picture of managerial power theory is that the  
pay-setting procedure is influenced by the CEO and salary contract leads in favor of CEO at the 
expense of outside shareholders.  
We have to draw accurate and justifiable lines in between the salary figures of top to low level of 
management in any company. We have to make certain rules that can stop this influence. There 
should be no any he differences. The compensation of a CEO is not just the salary that he gets 
monthly. The six basic factors of compensation are the basic salary, the periodic bonuses, long-
term incentive plans, insurance, paid perquisites and profit sharing in the form of stock options. 
In order to define the compensation of CEO according to the economic condition of the country, 
it can be better to do an analysis through distributive justice or rather an interesting critique? It 
should be done for satisfying the other employees like a low wage worker. The role of society as 
well as acting government becomes more important to create this justice among salary figures. It 
should not be skyrocketing. Jared Harris (2006) in his research writes about the three theories 
regarding the distributive justice for executive compensation. John Rawls’ theory of justice as 
fairness (1971) defines two codes of justice to establish distributive justice. The first principle is 
the liberty principle which declares that "each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic rights and liberties". Rawls(1971)  declared the second principle as the 
equality principle which states: "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity."  The high pay scale of CEOs is considered as a wasted expense for the company. 
Others believe in the trickle-down effect of the CEO compensations. Jared Harris (2006) debates 
about both of these opinions while considering the second point of the Rawls’ research. 
According to Harris (2006) proper incentives for the CEO will have a good effect on the 
performance of the company, thus increasing profits and rewarding the stakeholders. This is an 
important factor in favor of better CEO compensations. Aside from this there is no real proof of 
trickling down of the profits; hence there is a high probability that the profits might be consumed 
by the high level employees of the company. According to a research by Jared Harris (2006) 
many studies have been unsuccessful in linking the executive incentive with better performance 
of the company. Yes, it is true that the main power is CEO and he has the power to make fair pay 
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scale through the legitimate power that he/she possess but CEOs get the benefit of their influence 
over the boards instead of performance. He named Murphy (1999), Mishra et al. (2000) and 
Blasi & Kruse (2003) as the researchers who were unsuccessful in establishing the link. Harris 
further writes that Blasi and Kruse (2003) have shown a worsened performance for the company 
when the executive incentives were increased. From 1993 to 2001 the companies that gave their 
managers the smallest shares of options got a 31.3 % annual return while the shareholders that 
gave a lot of incentives to their executives received only 22.5% return. Yermack (2004) 
researched that the CEOs that use company maintained aircraft for their personal affairs were 
damaging the profits of the company hence the lowering the stock prices in the market. 
Another point here worth mentioning is that the Rawl’s second point also discusses about the fair 
equality of opportunity. This claims that the position of the CEO should be an open position that 
is not restricted or reserved to a few chosen people. There should be a motive among the 
company’s board of directors that the position of Chief executive officer must be filled by the 
most talented person, who will then be able to perform in the best possible way. This behavior 
will truly boost the performance of the company due to the fact that a talented CEO will benefit 
every stakeholder of the company even the least well off stakeholder. 
Considering the Rawls’ statements in mind and examining the current scenario of the market, it 
is easily understandable that the companies face tough challenges in devising a strategic plan that 
can tackle these problems efficiently. Hence companies often face random and irregular 
environment. This kind of environment creates unpredictability. This unpredicted flow of profits 
is forcing the companies and government to adopt regulations to restrict and control the cash 
flow among all the stake holders of the company.  
In South Africa the King III report was released in February 2009. This report lays out a plan for 
how the remuneration committee should assist the board in developing remuneration policy. 
Only with the approval of the shareholders can the policy come into effect. The policy for 
remuneration should be justified and fairly compensate the employees of the company. In the 
long term scenario, the focus of the policy should be to enhance the shareholder value. The 
policy should define the company’s strategic objectives and the implementation path, annual 
salaries and bonuses and other incentives offered to the employees. The performance of 
executive should be measured accurately and incentive schemes should be reviewed regularly. 
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The stock options incentives and other long-term incentives should be linked with the 
performance of the executives. The executives should participate in the enhancement of 
shareholder value commensurate with the benefits and perks of the job. 
2.3 The Board and its Sub-Committees 
The board of directors is a group of people whose job is to manage the activities of a company. 
The board of directors, sometimes referred to as just the board, are responsible to uphold the 
interest of the company and its stakeholders. The members of the board are usually called 
directors who are elected by the shareholders of the company on pre- allotted terms. The elected 
directors can be the owners themselves, the company’s managers or any other person. Directors 
who are owners are usually referred to as the insiders and the directors who are managers are 
called executive directors. The norm in South Africa with respect to board regulation is the use 
of a rotating system for the members of the board, which assists in the avoidance of any hostile 
takeovers. The phenomenon of hostile takeovers has since dissipated. The CEO’s have 
historically used their influence to set their own salaries by interfering in the salary-setting 
process. This exposes only a few members of the board for election at any given time so it is 
virtually impossible to change the entire board at the same time. The number of directors can 
vary in different companies according to the company size. 
The Board of Directors the governing body tasked to supervise and guide the vision of the firm. 
It is usually stipulated that the majority of board members be non-executive members of the firm. 
It is one of the mechanisms employed to shape a company’s value system. (Kakabadse & 
Morsing, 2006: 44). Without the board the preservation of a company’s assumed good name will 
be left solely in the hands of the CEO and executive managers. The roles and responsibilities of 
directors can vary according the type of company they are associated with. Usually it is the 
responsibility of the board to evaluate and approve the Compensation of the CEO. Other than 
this, the board’s typical duties are as follows: 
 Establish company policies and objectives; 
 Select, appoint, support and review the performance of the CEO; 
 Ensure the accessibility to sufficient financial resources; 
 Approve budgets; 
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 Report the organization’s performance to the stakeholders. 
Many companies have an audit committee of the board that is responsible to supervise the task of 
accurately producing the financial statements and reports of the company.  There is also 
compensation committee that is responsible for allotting base compensations, stock options, 
bonuses and other incentives to the company’s executives. The boards follow a strict strategic 
plan for the allocation of salaries and incentives for the CEO and other executives. Many 
companies offer high compensations and benefits for CEOs, hence expect improved performance 
from the CEO every fiscal year. 
The directors of the board have controlling power over the company. They are answerable to the 
shareholders about the performance of the company; hence they are given the rights to make 
decisions collectively for the betterment of the company. The board members exercise their 
powers in boards meetings in which the allotted quorum must be present. The directors must 
abide by the rules of the company and act in good faith for the benefit of the shareholders. 
The director and the shareholder share a relationship where the interest of both should be same. 
It is the duty of the directors to ensure that their interests do not conflict with the interests of the 
shareholder. This reduces the probability of the agency problem from occurring. The conflict of 
interest can never be avoided completely because of the fact that wherever a director involves 
himself in a transaction with the company, theoretically the interests of director and the company 
become conflicted. Theoretically the transaction is in favor of the director, but as far as the 
company is concerned it is an added expense in the accounts. This creates an agency problem. 
Lord Cranworth said in Aberdeen Ry V Blaikie (1854) that: a corporate body can only work by 
using agents. The agents should work in complete harmony with the interests of the company. In 
no way, should the agents be allowed to engage in acts that eventually conflict their interests 
with the company’s interest. 
In spite of such statements, members of the board are allowed to transact their allotted money 
from the company account. But it should be noted here that the directors are not allowed to use 
the company’s assets for their own profits.  In the famous case of Regal (Hastings) Ltd V 
Gulliver (1942), the House of Lords had the opinion that the directors performed their duties in 
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the company while acting in such a way that resulted in their personal enrichment. The directors 
were stripped of the profits that they had made and that money was given to the shareholders. 
 
 
2.4 Boardroom Diversity and Composition 
Numerous studies have been conducted in the quest to extrapolate what the effect of boardroom 
dynamics have on one or more dimensions of the firm’s operations. One could for instance ask 
how efficiently decisions are made in a boardroom characterized by a high degree of age 
variance. Does it advance the process or inhibit it? The matter of composition and diversity of 
the board is of particular importance to our study as it covers several hypotheses stated in this 
paper. Within the theme of diversity and composition we will address empirically how the level 
of CEO Compensation responds to: 
 The board’s gender makeup 
 The board’s racial profile 
 The age of the board 
 Board size 
 The influence of foreign chair- and directorships 
 
Bøhren & Strøm (2010) are of the opinion that heterogeneity generally inhibits the functioning of 
the board’s decisiveness. Of course, their study did not include all the explanatory variables 
selected for this study. The question of race is, for instance, very South Africa specific and a 
largely exploratory aspect of the study. 
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Determinants of CEO Compensation In South Africa 
Chapter 3: The Regulatory Framework 
 
3.1  CEO Compensation in the Contemporary South African Business Enivironment 
‘’For four decades South Africa's international relations were dogged by the apartheid issue. By 
the end of the 1980s, South Africa was one of the most isolated states on earth.’’ Nelson 
Mandela (Council on Foreign Relations, 1993) 
When assessing the South African environment, business or otherwise, it would be short-sighted 
not to take cognisance of her tumultuous past. For the legacy of this past still lingers 
uncomfortably to this day, in dire need of correction. The regulatory framework initiated since 
the dawn of democracy has been geared towards ensuring that senior management and the board 
of directors are more representative of the greater society. This translates into better 
representation of previously disenfranchised groups, such as blacks and women. 
 
3.1.1 Apartheid 
In 1948 a formal system of segregation between ethnic groups was instituted, effectively 
rendering the majority of the population voiceless. Under this system, participation in the 
economy and the political discourse was defined along racial lines. Non-whites had effectively 
become second-class citizens, with every vestige of influence on the central political system 
eroded.  
 
3.1.2 Transformation 
1994 ushered in a new era for the country, forever changing its course. For the first time in its 
history, South Africa had become truly democratic. The moment brought with it great 
expectations beyond the scope of democracy. The disenfranchised majority yearned to 
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participate meaningfully in the economy of the new South Africa. At this point the country was 
already characterised by gross levels of inequality. At the core of the ruling party’s policy, was to 
address poverty and inequality (Beinart, 2001, 309). The accumulation process under Apartheid 
confined the creation of wealth to a racial minority and imposed underdevelopment on black 
communities. To be clear, the Apartheid policies systematically placed such a stranglehold on all 
people of colour, that even today a vast section of them are excluded from the economic 
environment. (http://www.dti.gov.za/bee/complete.pdf)         
In this context, the term ’black’ refers to all non-white citizens which includes black Africans, 
Indians and so-called coloured ethnicities.  
 
3.1.3 Black Economic Empowerment 
Since the inception of democratic reform, the government has reversed the policies of racial 
discrimination characterised by apartheid. However, it was understood that simply altering the 
legal framework into one that was embodied fairness was not sufficient to bring about 
meaningful change. They had to go beyond this and do so aggressively. A policy of affirmative 
action was subsequently introduced to promote equality and fair representation across all spheres 
of society, including the boards of companies. This policy still persists today. Formally, this 
policy which consists of a range of remedial legal measures is known as Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE). ‘’The government defines BEE as an integrated and coherent socio-
economic process that directly contributes to the economic transformation of South Africa and 
brings about significant increases in the numbers of black people that manage, own and control 
the country’s economy, as well as significant decreases in income 
inequalities,’’(http://www.dti.gov.za/bee/complete.pdf). Of particular significance to this 
research project is the management requirement entrenched in the BEE policy brief. This will 
become evident when examining the makeup of the Board of Directors. With that said, it is an 
unambiguous policy objective of BEE to significantly increase the number of black people at 
senior and executive levels in the corporate environment.  
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3.2 The Regulatory environment 
3.2.1 Corporate Governance defined 
According to the OECD principals, corporate governance is defined as ’’...a set of relationships 
between management, the board and stakeholders of a company and also provides a structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives 
and monitoring performance.’’(Ali & Gregoriou, 2006: 100). This description is generally 
accepted but it must be borne in mind that the definition of corporate governance is subject to the 
code employed. Sir Adrian Cadbury, widely cited as the father of corporate governance, defines 
it as follows: ‘’Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic 
and social goals and between individual and communal goals…the aim is to align as nearly as 
possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society”(Corporate Governance Overview, 
1999).  
3.2.2 The King codes of governance 
The King I report was the first code of governance produced in South Africa, spearheaded by 
former High Court judge, Mervyn King in 1994. It stipulated codes of conduct and generally 
accepted practices in companies. The code, while not legally binding, was recognised at the time 
as the most comprehensive publication on the subject, embracing an inclusive approach to 
corporate governance. It was unprecedented in the field of corporate governance as the code 
went beyond the realm of the financial and regulatory environment to encompass a wide range of 
stakeholders.  
 
The inclusive approach stipulates that the company clearly defines its goals, values and the 
relevant stakeholders. The daily activities and direction of the company must, in turn, be 
communicated explicitly to all stakeholders. The relationship between the company and 
stakeholders should ideally be mutually beneficial in nature. Evidence suggests that this strategy 
promotes the firm’s longevity and the long-term growth in shareholder wealth. (Institute of 
Directors in Southern Africa, 2002, 7) 
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3.2.3 King II 
The King I reported was revised in 2002 and followed up with the King II report. The need to 
amend the King I code of governance was spurred on by the evolution of the global economic 
environment and legislative changes. The King II report most notably introduces the concept of 
the ‘Triple-Bottom line’  which emphasizes the necessity to take into account not only financial 
impacts but also on the social and environmental impact on a company’s operations. The code 
applies to all listed companies, financial institutions and the realm of the public sector. The aim 
of King II is to improve governance and accountability on a voluntary basis for affected 
companies, although all organisations are encouraged to adopt the code. 
(www.gt.co.za/Publications/Effective-directors-guide/kingII.asp)                      
The King commission identified 7 cornerstones of good corporate governance. These are listed 
below: 
 Discipline at senior management level and a commitment to practices that are accepted 
universally to be good and proper. 
 Transparency  requires that the company make all financial and non-financial information 
pertaining to the firm available in an accurate and timely fashion so that outsiders are able to 
make informed decisions. 
 Independence refers to the extent to which conflicts of interest are minimized at board level. 
This could come in the form of a highly dominant CEO or a shareholder who owns are large 
stake in the firm. Various mechanisms used to improve on independence will be discussed in a 
later section. 
 Responsibility must be taken by management and the board alike in the event of 
mismanagement. Mechanisms must also be put in place for corrective measures to be undertaken 
and to penalize transgressors. 
 Accountability must be exercised by all members who make decisions or take actions on 
pertinent issues. As with responsibility, sufficient mechanisms must be implemented to foster a 
greater accountability. Enforcement of these parameters serves to create confidence in the board 
from the perspective of shareholders. 
 Fairness. The rights of all stakeholders in the company must be respected. No single individual’s 
right’s is to take precedence over another. 
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 Social Responsibility has become an increasingly important characteristic of a good corporate 
citizen. Companies are to take cognisance of the environment in which they operate and place a 
special emphasis on behaviour that is ethical, non-discriminatory and non-exploitative. It is vital 
that companies act in a responsible manner with respect to human rights and environmental 
issues. 
(Institute of Directors in Southern Africa,2002:11) 
With respect to non-financial goals, companies are compelled to report on the following:  
 Safety and occupational health issues, including HIV/Aids in the workplace. This is of 
 particular  importance in the case of South Africa, where it accounts for 17% of global 
 HIV/AIDS prevalence. 
 
 Environmental Impact Assessment and selecting the option with the least harmful impact 
 
 The social impact on society. This entails, inter alia, adopting the principals of Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE). Since the advent of democracy in South Africa, transformation in the 
corporate environment has been a national priority to address the imbalances of the past. It also 
encourages a culture of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). This reinforces the stakeholder 
view adopted in the King I report.  
 
 Human Capital Development, in which special efforts must be made with respect to     training 
existing staff, achieving equity goals and creating opportunities for women and other previously 
disadvantaged groups. 
 
3.2.4 King II and the Board of Directors 
In the context of this paper, the board is of paramount importance in our analysis of CEO 
compensation since it is ultimately the duty of the board to establish his/her remuneration 
package. It would therefore be foolish to ignore the legal framework within which the board 
operates.                       The 
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information in the following section was accessed from a Grant Thornton publication on the 
King II Report (http://www.gt.co.za/Publications/Effective-directors-guide/kingII.asp)  
CEO-CHAIRMAN DUALITY 
The King II report makes it abundantly clear that there should be a division of responsibilities 
between CEO and Chairman. The reason is also unambiguous: It is necessary that no single 
member of the board has disproportionate or insurmountable power. However, in the event that 
duality is unavoidable the independency issue can be remedied in one of two ways. An 
independent director must be elected to the position of deputy chair. Alternatively, the board 
must be comprised of a strong contingent of independent directors. 
DIRECTOR REMUNERATION 
Decisions regarding the remuneration of directors are borne solely by a remuneration committee, 
comprised mainly or wholly of independent directors. The rationale behind the independence 
criteria is to foster objective decision-making with respect to remuneration issues. Furthermore, 
during this process the CEO may attend by invitation only but withdraw his presence when his 
remuneration is the article on the agenda. The remuneration committee is accountable to the 
shareholders of the company through the annual report. The report should incorporate a full 
disclosure of the said committee’s membership, a comprehensive breakdown of each member’s 
remuneration package, and the remuneration philosophy entrenched within the committee. This 
transparency promotes democracy amongst shareholders who can express their approval or 
disapproval of the board through a vote at the annual general meeting. 
Directors should be compensated at a level which would attract and retain directors 
commensurate to their quality. The higher the calibre of the director, the greater will be the 
compensation attributed to him or her. It also stipulates that a large proportion of the 
compensation package should be performance-based. Implicitly, it refers to the bonus component 
of the package. This standard applies to directors at both executive and non-executive status. As 
with the remuneration committee, the annual report should fully disclose the total and 
composition of all directors’ remuneration including that of the CEO.  
BOARD COMMITTEES 
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Board committees serve as a control and accountability mechanism. It also ensures the most 
efficient division of duties within the greater board. King II states that at the very least, a board 
should establish an auditing committee and a remuneration committee. Furthermore, all 
committees must be headed by an independent director. This requirement is waivered only in the 
case of operational committees, which are tasked to control and evaluate the core operations of 
the company. The accountability factor yet again comes to the fore, as the committee 
chairpersons are verbally held to task at the annual general meeting where shareholders are 
entitled to extract information from them on any pressing issues regarding the mandates of their 
respective committees.  
Board committees have no executive power, but are essentially the engine rooms through which 
the board can make more enlightened decisions in a democratic manner based on the findings 
delivered by these specialised committees. A formal procedure is recommended for the purposes 
of task delegation by the board to the committees. In turn, the board committee is required to 
report back to the board after each meeting 
INDEPENDENCE OF DIRECTORS 
Included in the annual report should be a list of the board members, clearly classing them as 
executive, independent, or non-executive. Like much of the King II parameters, the disclosure of 
this information geared specifically for accountability and transparency to all stakeholders.  
Executive directors are advised by the code not to exceed a term of three years, with the 
exception of intervention by shareholders on the issue. The idea here is to maintain a healthy 
balance of power and to breathe new life into a board. Included in the category of executive 
directors are so-called shadow directors, who direct the operations of the firm behind the scenes. 
If there any doubt exists to the board and all its stakeholders about what qualifies a director as 
being independent, the King II report makes it distinct. It identifies no less than six parameters to 
satisfy the condition of independence. An independent, non-executive director must not: 
 Be a representative or nominee of a major shareholder 
 Have been an employee of the company in question in the last three financial years 
 Serve in a professional advisory role in the company 
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 Have a significant business interest in the company 
 Be a signatory to any significant contractual arrangements with said company 
 Have any other business endeavours or special relationships which would constitute a conflict of 
interest 
 
The independent directors serve an important function on the board, and would ideally constitute 
the majority of any board. By not being personally invested in the company, with the exception 
of their reputations, they are able to serve the stakeholders with the highest degree of objectivity. 
They are effectively the eyes of the shareholders and their monitoring function is indispensible. 
Apart from being objective monitors, they are an invaluable source of advice especially if they 
have served on other boards. 
 
BOARD MEETINGS 
 
The King II code of governance recommends that the board meets at least every three months 
and that the number of meetings be recorded in the annual report with a concise list of attendees.  
Amongst other items on the board’s agenda, they should review the systems and processes of 
these meetings with the aim of producing greater efficiency. This includes the evaluation of 
internal control mechanisms to attain even higher levels of effectiveness. Since the philosophy of 
the King II report on governance is driven by the Triple-Bottom-Line, a high degree of 
cognisance of ALL stakeholders must be observed. The board is encouraged to incorporate the 
non-financial aspects of the company pertaining to this broad base of stakeholders at these 
meetings. 
 
The tenets of the King II code of governance underscore the importance of transparency, 
accountability, independence and a commitment to all stakeholders. The systems are designed in 
such a way that all these objectives are met. As mentioned before, the King II report was 
evolutionary and acclaimed widely as the most progressive document on corporate governance at 
the time of its inception. However, by 2008 the King Commission recognised that this document 
ran the risk of becoming obsolete. King II had to evolve with a changing corporate and 
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institutional environment, locally and internationally. The King III report was born on 9 
September 2009, building on King II. 
 
3.2.5 The King III Report 
 
‘’As with King I and King II, the King Committee endeavoured to be at the forefront of 
governance internationally and this has again been achieved by focusing on the importance of 
reporting annually on how a company has both positively and negatively affected the economic 
life of the community in which it operated during the year under review.’’     
(Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2009)  
Essentially, this is not a new path for the King series. In fact, it is a natural progression of the 
Triple-Bottom-Line concept. It just goes a step further by requesting companies to quantify the 
societal dimension of thereof. King III goes deeper into unchartered territory by stipulating that it 
is not enough to merely quantify its economic impact on the immediate community. Companies 
are encouraged to put in place tangible plans for the following financial year geared at enhancing 
its positive impact on the community, if the effect was in fact positive, and to eradicate any 
negative effects on economic life of the community if the effect was to the contrary. (Institute of 
Directors in Southern Africa, 2009) As with its predecessor, the ‘comply or explain’ still holds. 
 
King III places considerable emphasis on sustainability social transformation issues, thereby 
broadening the scope of corporate governance. The document acknowledges that these ideals can 
only be pursued through effective, visionary leadership. Within this updated framework, 
sustainability becomes the cornerstone of economic and moral considerations, and a driver for 
opportunities and risk in the business environment. The leadership within organisations must 
appreciate the complex nature in which business interacts with the natural environment and 
society at large. This once again reinforces the notion of the Triple-Bottom-Line. It is argued that 
firms will be able to extract long-term value if these three spheres are integrated in a responsible 
and efficient manner. By doing so, it represents a paradigm shift in doing business. No longer is 
it sufficient to observe these three layers in isolation, but rather to co-ordinate these layers in a 
synergistic way. One of the means to reach these goals is to introduce innovative approaches to 
sustainability in a way that increases profitability. The document does not produce explicit 
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solutions to innovation, instead leaving it up to the brains trust within the firm.  Another aspect 
of sustainability pertinent to the South African context is the notion of fairness. The King III 
report recognises that social injustice is not sustainable over a longer horizon and that great leaps 
are to be made to integrate marginalised groups in this program. As discussed in the outset of this 
chapter, the issue of transformation in South Africa is the centrepiece of the political 
environment which must be addressed and embraced by all sectors of society in an efficient, 
inclusive and profitable approach. 
 
In a sense the updated approach to sustainability is a resurgence of the King II report’s 
recommendations on sustainability reporting. Although the tenets proposed by King II on 
sustainability reporting had become widely accepted practice in the country, there was a 
disconnect based on trust between business and society at large regarding the intentions and 
practices of corporations. Business executives voiced a grievance of their own on this matter. 
They felt that sustainability reporting had failed to return the promised benefits without 
impinging on their profits. The new integrated approach to reporting is an attempt to correct 
these and other disparities. Apart from the all-encompassing reporting framework mentioned 
thus far, the audit committee is required to release a statement to the board of directors and 
shareholders on the effectiveness of internal financial controls. This would form part of the 
integrated report. In addition to this, risk management is to play a greater role in the governance 
of the firm under the auspices of a formal risk management process. Lastly, the board must look 
into the strategic role of information technology, if any, and how it affects the process of 
governance in the company. (Institute of Directors in Southern Africa, 2009)  
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Determinants of CEO Compensation In South Africa 
Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Research is the seeking or search for knowledge. The word ‘research’ derives from the French 
word ‘recherché’ which means to travel through. The formal definition of research is a 
systematic and objective process of collecting, recording and analysing information or data in 
order to increase our understanding of the phenomenon or problem about which are interested 
(Zikmund,2000). The research process is multifaceted and presents the researcher with numerous 
options with respect to strategy. The aim of this chapter is to present the different paradigms of 
research available and to provide the rationale for my preference for the strategy which was 
ultimately settled upon. I will discuss the research design, research method, sampling technique 
employed, and an assessment of the data collection method. The blueprint of my research 
strategy is captured in the table on the next page. 
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Research Theme Corresponding Choice 
Research Type  Quantitative  
Research design   Descriptive  
Data type     Secondary data from Annual reports of listed firms 
Population   Listed firms from South Africa 
Sampling frame  
 Firms listed on the  Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) 
Sampling method   Non probability (Convenience sampling) 
Dependent variable   CEO compensation 
Independent variables  
Firm size, ROA, Board Size, Chairperson is Founder, 
Chairperson Remuneration, Chairperson is Former 
CEO, Chairperson is Domestic, Chairperson is 
Executive, Percentage of Independent  Directors, 
Percentage of Female Directors, Age  of Board, 
Percentage of Black Directors, Percentage of Foreign 
Board Members, Percentage of  Non-Executive 
directors in Compensation Committee, Percentage of  
Foreigners in Compensation Committee.  
Control variables  Industry and Year 
Statistical method  
Multiple regression analysis 
Ordinary Least Squares Method 
 
Table 4.1: Research Strategy/Framework. 
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4.2 Research Design 
A research design provides the roadmap for carrying out the project. The choice of research 
design must ensure that it is best suited to providing the relevant outcomes vis-à-vis research 
questions, and do so in the most efficient manner. The culmination of this section represents the 
completion of the formulation phase of the research process. Business research designs are 
generally categorised into one of three groups namely, (i) Exploratory, (i) Descriptive, or (iii) 
Causal (Hair et al, 2003). 
 
Exploratory Research 
Exploratory research is typically conducted during the formative stage of a research project in 
order to clarify ambiguous problems. The purpose of the exploratory research process is 
essentially to get acquainted with the topic, narrowing the scope of the research topic, and then 
transforming discovered problems into defined ones (Zikmund, 2000). Ghauri & Grønhaug 
(2002) concur by saying that when a research problem is badly understood, the choice of the 
exploratory approach is warranted. It is therefore expected that subsequent research will be 
required to provide conclusive evidence. Cooper and Schindler (2006) illustrate graphically 
where exploratory research resides within the greater realm of the research process. This is given 
in Figure 1 below by the area titled ‘exploration’.  
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Figure 4.1: Integration of Secondary Data into the Research Process. 
Source: Zikmund (2000) 
 
Unless research into a certain study area has been thoroughly exhausted, is well understood by 
scholars and practitioners, and if there is no ambiguity about the theoretical bases, a study is 
expected to incorporate some level of exploratory research. The extent thereof is subject to the 
30 
 
degree to which the conditions above are satisfied. 
 
Descriptive Research 
Descriptive research continues where exploratory research ends. It is a formalised procedure in 
contrast to the unstructured nature of initial exploration. Unlike exploratory research, descriptive 
studies are based on some previous understanding of the nature of the research problem 
(Zikmund, 2000).  To be clear, descriptive research is underpinned heavily by the hypotheses 
formulated in the exploration phase. The goal of descriptive research would then be to test these 
hypotheses scientifically. It can be inferred by the reader that descriptive studies are used to 
describe some or other phenomenon. It is used, for instance, to describe the characteristics 
associated with a given sample, provide estimates of population proportions consistent with these 
characteristic, and to describe the correlations among several variables.  
(Cooper & Schindler, 2006) 
Descriptive research activity includes establishing a sample frame, deciding upon data collection 
mechanisms, collecting , checking and coding the data. Depending on the research objective, 
descriptive studies can either provide the user with a snapshot of a phenomenon at a specific 
point in time – cross-sectional studies, or a long-term perspective which captures changes in the 
phenomenon over an extended period of time – longitudinal studies. (Hair et al, 2003) 
 
Causal Research 
Causal research, like descriptive research, is characterised by a structured or formalised 
approach.   
The goal of causal research is the identification of cause-and-effect relationships between 
variables. The level of analysis inherent in this approach requires the researcher to have a rich 
grasp of the research subject. This is because there must be an established expectation of the 
interaction between variables derived from the relevant literature. (Zikmund, 2000) 
The underlying premise of causal analysis is that the presence of some element, say A, brings 
about a change in another variable, B. On an empirical level, it is impossible to demonstrate with 
absolute certainty whether a causal relationship exists between two entities. This is the case 
31 
 
because it is not possible to factor in all other variables which have a bearing on the A-B 
relationship. The result will thus always be inconclusive (Cooper & Schindler, 2006). The user is 
only able to draw inferences of causation via descriptive statistics. 
 
The research design implemented in this particular study will take the form of descriptive with 
some elements of causal research. The decision to go this route emanates from the fact that the 
theory on executive compensation is well established, rendering exploratory research redundant. 
The theoretical framework in this paper has sought to provide a sufficient context for the 
variables under scrutiny so as to arrive at meaningful hypotheses. It is also necessary to establish 
causation amongst variables, if any, to explain the level of CEO compensation. 
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4.3 Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
 
RESEARCH METHODS
Qualitative Quantitative
Case 
studies Observation
Informal 
interviews
Secondary 
data
Content 
analysis Surveys
Experim
ents
Secondary 
data
Participant Non‐participant Questionnaires Structured interviews
Overt Covert Overt Covert Official statistics
Figure 4.2 Illustration of qualitative and quantitative methods
 
QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 
The quantitative paradigm is based on positivism, a science characterized by empirical research 
where all phenomena can be reduced to empirical indicators which represent the truth. The 
ontological position of the quantitative paradigm is that there is only one truth, an objective 
reality that exists independent of human perception. Under this regime, the investigator and that 
being investigated are independent entities. Therefore, the investigator is capable of studying a 
phenomenon without influencing it or being influenced by it. (Sale et al, 2002) 
Quantitative research operates within a well-defined theoretical framework, derived from 
literature and/or previous research, allowing one to commence with a clear underlying 
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understanding or expectation of a how a particular phenomenon is likely to behave (Remenyi et 
al, 1998). This understanding will have been developed into a formalised model. Since the model 
is rigid, it is usually obvious what data is required to answer a particular research question. 
Quantitative research attempts precise measurement of some phenomenon. Quantitative 
methodologies allow the researcher to answer questions such as how much or how many, how 
often, when and who (Cooper & Schindler, 2006). The goal is to measure and analyze causal 
relationships between variables within a value-free framework (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994) 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
‘Qualitative research is based on evidence that is not easily reduced to numbers. In some cases 
the evidence cannot be reduced to numbers and any attempt to do so would not be useful. In such 
cases statistical techniques are not sensible and hermeneutic (interpretive) approaches are 
preferable.’ (Remenyi et al, 1998) 
This view is complimented by Cooper & Schindler (2006) who assert that qualitative research 
includes an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate and 
otherwise come to terms with the meaning (not frequency as with quantitative studies) of 
naturally occurring phenomena in society.  
 
Qualitative research is subjective in nature and leaves much of the measurement process is left at 
the discretion of the researcher. Unlike its counterpart, this particular approach does not make 
use of rigorous mathematical analysis. Qualitative research is exploratory in nature and is 
conducted by means of experience surveys i) experience surveys, ii) secondary data analysis, iii) 
case studies and iv) pilot studies. (Zikmund, 2000) 
Qualitative research is often disregarded as a lesser form scientific inquiry due its unstructured 
character. Ghauri & Grønhaug(2002) counter this line of thought by stating that research is not 
necessarily better simply because it is quantitative. The methods and techniques employed 
depend entirely on the research problem and what approach would be most suitable to answer 
that question. 
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The table below illustrates the most poignant differences between the two approaches. Given the 
nature of the study of CEO compensation and the sheer breadth of information cultivated in this 
field, it is quite clear that the best choice for this study would be the quantitative approach. 
 
Table 4.2 The difference in emphasis in qualitative versus quantitative analysis 
Source: Ghauri & Grønhaug (2002) 
 
Qualitative Methods 
 
Quantitative Methods 
 
 Emphasis on understanding  
 Focus on understanding from respondent’s
point of view 
 Interpretation and rational approach 
 Observations and measurements in natural 
settings 
 Subjective ‘insider view’ and closeness to 
data 
 Explorative orientation 
 Process oriented 
 Holistic perspective 
 Generalisation by comparison of 
properties and contexts of individual 
organism 
 
 
 Emphasis on testing and verification 
 
 Focus on facts and/or reasons for social 
events 
 Logical and critical approach 
 
 Controlled measurement 
 
 Objective ‘outsider view’ distant from data 
 
 Hypothetical-deductive, focus on 
hypothesis testing 
 
 Result-oriented 
 
 Particularistic and analytical 
 
 Generalisation by population membership 
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4.4 Data Collection 
Within the framework of quantitative analysis, there are two broad approaches to collecting data: 
primary and secondary data. You may refer to figure 4.1 to put into perspective. Primary data is 
sub-categorised further into experimental data, surveys and content analysis. I will not go into 
great length about these sub-categories as primary data was not used for the purposed of this 
project. Secondary data, in the form of annual financial reports, was collected instead. These 
reports cover the full spectrum of data that was needed to answer the research questions posed at 
the outset. It is a mandatory legal requirement that all firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange to provide a full disclosure on directors’ compensation, the composition of the board, 
compliance with the King Codes of Corporate Governance, and the financial position of the firm.  
 
4.5 Population and sampling method 
For several reasons it is rarely possible to test empirical generalizations against all the members 
of a target population. The basic idea of sampling is that by selecting some of the elements in a 
population, we may draw conclusions about the entire population (Cooper & Schindler, 2006). 
The process of sampling involves any procedure using a small number or items or parts of the 
whole population to make conclusions regarding the whole population. The purpose of sampling 
is to enable researchers to estimate some unknown characteristics of a population. (Zikmund, 
2000) 
The benefits of sampling include: 
 Cost-effectiveness 
It is intuitive that sampling a representative portion of a population, as opposed to the entire 
population, would translate into less financial strain. The logistical cost of acquiring data from 
the aggregate of a geographically dispersed population renders this approach unfeasible in most 
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cases. 
 
 Greater speed of collection 
Again, for a large geographically dispersed population it is unforeseeable for a researcher to 
cover the entire constituency in a timely fashion. For this reason, a representative sample is 
preferred as the next best option. 
 
 Accuracy 
While it may be intuitively appealing to conclude that a population would yield better results, 
Cooper & Schindler (2006) argue that the quality of a study may be markedly improved through 
sampling by means of more thoroughly scrutinising missing, suspicious and incorrect data; a 
higher level of supervision; and better processing than would otherwise be possible.   
 
4.6 The Sampling Process 
The process and decisions made at this stage of the research are integral to the eventual quality 
of the research findings. It is comprised of the steps listed in the figure below. In practice this 
sequence of steps are not necessarily followed to the tee. Room does exist for some degree of 
flexibility depending on the nature of the research.  
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  Figure 4.3: Stages in Selection of a Sample 
  Source: Based on Zikmund (2000) 
 
  Target Population 
 The target population refers to the universe of elements from which samples are drawn (Remenyi 
 et al, 1998). In the case of this study, the target population is the universe of all South African  
 firms. 
 
  Sample Frame 
 A sample frame is a comprehensive list of objects from which a sample is to be drawn. More 
 clearly, it asks the researcher to define the population with precision (Remenyi et al, 1998). 
 While the target population is simply defined as all South African firms, the sample frame for 
 this study is all South African firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
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 between 2005 and 2009. During this period, the population of firms listed on the JSE grew from 
 388 to 416.  
 
  Probability versus Non-Probability Sampling 
 Of the numerous sampling techniques that are at the disposal of researchers, two distinct 
 categories exist namely, probability sampling and non-probability sampling. As their names may 
 suggest, it pertains to the probability of an object being selected or sampled out of the sample 
 frame. In probability sampling every element in the population has a known non-zero probability 
 of being selected. In contrast, in non-probability sampling the probability of selection is 
 unknown because the method is arbitrary. (Zikmund, 2000) 
 The drawback of non-probability sampling is the fact that the researcher’s subjectivity may lead 
 to selection bias. The technique applied in this study will follow the non-probability paradigm. 
 This choice emanates from the time constraints surrounding the collection of the vast matrix of 
 heterogeneous data. Secondly, the availability of relevant information contained in the annual 
 reports was not consistent.   
 
 
  Procedure for Selecting Sampling Units  
 Within the realm of the non-probability sampling framework, the convenience method of 
 sampling best suits the characteristics in the research environment. This means that the samples 
 were selected according to what was most convenient to the researcher. In this instance, 
 availability played the most decisive role. From the sample frame, a total of 52 companies were 
 ultimately selected, yielding 240 observations. 
 
 4.7 Validity and Reliability 
Validity refers to accuracy. If the issues of reliability, validity, trustworthiness, quality and 
rigor are meant differentiating a 'good' from 'bad' research then  testing and increasing  the 
reliability, validity, trustworthiness, quality and rigor will be important to the research in 
any paradigm. (Golafshani, 2003). 
Reliability refers to consistency. This is a concept most known for testing and evaluating 
quantitative data. But as an idea, it is used for all kinds of research. It is a concept of good 
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quality research, in qualitative studies reliability then has the purpose of generating 
understanding. (Golafshani, 2003). This concept closely relates to “dependability”. So it is 
concerned with if we can depend on the results or not.  
To widen the spectrum of conceptualization of reliability and revealing the congruence of 
reliability and validity in qualitative research, Lincoln and Guba (1985) state that: "Since 
there can be no validity without reliability, a demonstration of the former is sufficient to 
establish the latter".  
Based on the above, I believe that I have sufficiently complied with the principals of 
reliability and validity. 
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 Determinants of CEO Compensation In South Africa 
Chapter 5:Regression Analysis and Findings 
 
5.1 The Multiple Regression Model: 
CEO_Total_Comp = α+ β1 (Chair_Rem) +β2 (Chair_Former_CEO) + β3 (Chair_Domestic) + β4 
(Chair_Founder ) + β5 (Executive_Chair) +β6 (Board_Size) + β7 (%_Ind._Directors) + β8 
(%_Female_Directors) + β9 (%_Foreign_Directors) + β10 (%_Black_Directors) +β11 
(Board_Age) + β12 (%_Non-Exec_in_Comp._Comm) + β13 (%_Foreign_in_Comp._Comm) + 
β14 (ROA) + β15Ln (Market_Cap) +ε 
Where, 
CEO_Total_Comp = Total Compensation of CEO; 
Chair_Rem = Remuneration of Chairperson; 
Chair_Former_CEO = Chairperson previously occupied position of CEO; 
Chair_Domestic = Chairperson is South African; 
Chair_Founder = Chairperson is founder of the firm; 
Executive_Chair = Chairperson serves executive role in firm; 
Board_Size = The number of directors on the board; 
% _Ind._Directors = Percentage of independent directors on the board; 
% _Female._Directors = Percentage of female directors on the board; 
% _Foreign._Directors = Percentage of foreign directors on the board; 
% _Black._Directors = Percentage of black directors on the board; 
Board_Age = Average age of the board; 
% _Non-Exec_in_Comp. Comm = Percentage of non-executive directors in compensation 
committee; 
% _Foreign_in_Comp._Comm = Percentage of foreign directors in compensation committee; 
ROA = Return on Assets; 
Ln(Market_Cap) = Natural log of firm’s market capitalization. 
41 
 
 
The estimation process followed the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) procedure. 
 
5.2  REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The following section outlines the regression model used for the purpose of evaluating the 
hypotheses. Regression analysis allows us to examine to what degree the independent variables 
influence the dependent variable, in this case CEO compensation. 
The most important factors to be considered within the framework of regression analysis are: 
The level of significance, or p-value, is the required level of statistical validation to conclude 
that variations have not taken place by chance. For the purpose of this study, the conventional 
significance level of 5% was chosen. In this case, a p-value below or equal to 0.05 is regarded as 
significant. 
The t-test is a statistical test which shows if each of the variables will have a significant effect 
on the dependent variables. 
F-test. The F-test is a statistical test which compares the variance between two dimensions; 
Mean squares(between) and Mean squares(within). The larger the sizes of these are, the higher is 
the probability for the result being significant. 
Model Fit. R2 (adjusted) represents the explanatory power of a model, and should ideally be as 
close to 1.00 as possible. An R-squared of 1.00 indicates that the variables in the model perfectly 
explains the phenomenon . 
The coefficient (β) of each of the independent variables indicates the proportional and 
directional relationship between the dependent and independent variables. It is not sufficient to 
look at the coefficients in isolation, since this is not a measure of significance.  
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5.2.1 Descriptive Presentation of the Data 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
CEO Total comp 7161572.97 5523175.210 145 
Chair Remuneration 1170586.23 1359123.959 145 
Chair former 
CEO(Yes=1, No=0) 
.12 .323 145 
Chair is (domestic = 1/ 
foreigner = 0) 
.97 .164 145 
Chair (founder=1,  not 
founder=0) 
.09 .287 145 
Chairman is executive 
in company(Yes=1, 
No=0) 
.14 .353 145 
Board size 11.90 3.517 145 
Percent of indep 
directors 
7.28591446
446114E-1 
2.047152884
695258E-1 
145 
Percent Female 
directors 
1.26995178
043911E-1 
9.170451426
076479E-2 
145 
Percent of foreign 
directors 
.10 .125 145 
Percent of blacks 
directors 
2.60002157
500544E-1 
1.582678470
348665E-1 
145 
Average age of board 54.1690 3.01157 145 
Percent of Non-exec in 
comp com 
95.37% 11.709% 145 
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Per of foreigners  in 
comp-com 
6.25% 16.147% 145 
ROA % 18.1673 19.71946 145 
Market Capitalization 
(Natural Log) 
9.32298565
419286E0 
1.618217201
568738E0 
145 
    
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Observations. This table displays, amongst other things, the number of observations in the 
sample set. The number of observations in the original sample stands at 240, but due to missing 
values for several of the variables this number has been reduced to 145. 
 
 Mean. This value is the sum of observed values divided by the number of observations.It is 
however not necessarily an accurate reflection of the sample. Outliers or extraordinary values 
may cause the mean value to be less representative than if the values are excluded. 
We observe, for instance, that the mean compensation of CEO’s is R 7 161 572.97. It is not clear 
whether this is in fact representative of the population since the sample accounts for a fraction of 
the population. One must bear in mind that the degree of heterogeneity amongst the companies 
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange with respect to industry, size and performance. The 
potential for outliers should ideally be taken into account. 
 Standard deviation. This number represents the degree of distortion from the mean across the 
entire sample. A high standard deviation tells us that the concentration of data diverges widely 
from the mean value. This too can be an indication of extreme outlier values. Conversely, a 
lower standard deviation implies that the data is concentrated close to the mean and therefore 
more effective for drawing statistical inferences.  
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Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .686a .471 .354 4437576.419 
 
Table 5.2: Model Summary 
 
Table 5.2 illustrates the robustness of the model – the ability of the independent variables to 
make extrapolations about the phenomenon being studied. The model’s explanatory power 
(explained variance) has been determined to be 47.1% for R2 and 35.4% for adjusted R2. This 
implies that the explanatory variables explain just over 47% percent of the variations in CEO 
compensation. 
 
 
ANOVAb 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.069E15 26 7.958E13 4.041 .000a 
Residual 2.324E15 118 1.969E13   
Total 4.393E15 144    
 
b. Dependent Variable: CEO Total comp 
Table 5.3: Anova Output 
 
From the Anova table we obverse that the variables which make up the model are indeed 
statistically significant. This is given by the last column in the table. 
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5.2.2 Correlation Analysis 
In this particular section we present the reader with the correlations between all the variables 
pertinent to this study. Correlation analysis is a prerequisite to conducting the regression 
analysis. It allows the researcher to identify the relationship between the independent variables in 
terms of direction and strength. But more importantly, it serves to identify any cases of 
multicollinearity where two or more predictor (independent) variables are highly correlated. 
Strong correlations amongst predictor variables do not necessarily compromise the robustness of 
the model as a whole, but it compromises the explanatory power of individual independent 
variables. The correlation coefficient value lies between 1 and -1, where 0 indicates no 
relationship; 1 indicates a perfectly positive relationship; and a value of -1 implies a perfectly 
negative relationship. The correlations are tabled on the next page. 
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t  
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CEO 
Compen
sation 
1.00                
Chairma
n 
Remune
ration 
.065 1.00
0 
              
Chairma
n is 
Former 
CEO 
.071 .233 1.00
0 
             
Chairma
n is 
Domesti
c 
.134 .089 .061 1.00
0 
            
Chairma
n is 
Founder 
-.123 .605 .486 .053 1.00
0 
           
Chairman 
is 
Executive 
-.148 .670 .520 .069 .625 1.00
0 
          
Board 
Size 
.306 .167 -.001 -.113 .023 -.100 1
.
0
0
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0 
% 
Indepen
dent 
Director
s 
-.024 -.213 -.011 -.056 -.187 -.227 .
1
9
5 
1.00
0 
        
% of 
Female 
Director
s 
.094 .008 -.059 .032 -.142 -.244 .
3
2
2 
.176 1.00
0 
       
% of 
Foreign 
Director
s 
.207 .000 .143 -.098 -.196 -.084 .
2
5
6 
.091 .163 1.000       
% of 
Black 
Director
s 
-.012 .096 -.120 .101 .041 -.113 .
3
6
8 
.299 .443 .080 1.00
0 
     
Average 
Age of 
Board 
.222 .148 .355 .091 .182 .148 .
0
8
8 
.102 .012 -.037 -.368 1.000     
%  Non-
Exec  in 
Comp. 
Comm 
.001 -.137 -.151 -.067 -.278 -.329 .
2
7
7 
.334 .367 .250 .228 .160 1.000    
% of 
Foreign
ers in 
Comp. 
.268 .074 .079 -.021 -.122 -.160 .
1
4
9 
.006 .286 .671 .088 -.083 .117 1.000   
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Table 5.4: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
In the table above we observe three cases of medium-strong correlations amongst independent 
variables: 
 
o We find that there is a medium-strong positive relationship, 0.670, between Executive 
Chairmanship and Chair Remuneration.  
 
o A medium-strong positive relationship is observed between Chairman Remuneration and the 
Chairman being the founder of the company, at a correlation level of 0.605 
 
o We observe a positive relationship of similar strength, 0.625, where the Chairman is the Founder 
and serves as an Executive Chairman. 
 
 
  
Commit
tee 
Return 
on 
Assets 
(ROA) 
.024 .004 .179 .091 .139 .103 -
.
0
6
5 
.244 -.015 -.127 .087 -.076 -.031 -.013 1.0
00 
 
Ln 
Market 
Capitali
zation 
.284 .249 .129 -.151 -.120 .199 .
3
3
4 
.143 .182 .330 .219 -.121 -.032 .193 .14
3 
1.0
00 
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Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t 
Sig. 
p-value B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -3.647E7 1.089E7  -3.347 .001 
Chair Remuneration .840 .584 .207 1.438 .153 
Chair former 
CEO(Yes=1, No=0) 
2063230.238 2065620.645 .121 .999 .320 
Chair is (domestic = 1/ 
foreigner = 0) 
5070014.494 2507622.964 .151 2.022 .045 
Chair (founder=1,  not 
founder=0) 
-3022699.685 2485386.419 -.157 -1.216 .226 
Chairman is executive 
in company(Yes=1, 
No=0) 
-6068172.906 2341484.104 -.388 -2.592 .011 
Board size 443919.978 191654.555 .283 2.316 .022 
Percent of independent 
directors 
-4691321.556 2570177.518 -.174 -1.825 .070 
Percentage of Female 
directors 
-9332433.150 5735570.246 -.155 -1.627 .106 
Percentage of foreign 
directors 
2967898.687 5537976.764 .067 .536 .593 
Percentage of black 
directors 
-1686370.420 4160691.679 -.048 -.405 .686 
Average age of board 530941.852 195897.063 .290 2.710 .008 
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Percentage of Non-exec 
in compensation 
committee 
-25379.942 43741.445 -.054 -.580 .563 
Percentage of foreigners 
in compensation 
committee 
30690.111 38383.269 .090 .800 .426 
ROA % 9710.504 24517.027 .035 .396 .693 
LnMarketCapitalization 845872.050 352456.230 .248 2.400 .018 
      
 
Table 5.5: Regression Output 
 
5.2.3 Interpretation of Regression Output 
We are now in a position to interpret the results of the regression output. This has been done in a 
manner that is orderly albeit somewhat laboured. The variables are assessed one at a time 
according to the key descriptive parameters – t-value, coefficient value and sign, and the 
significance level.  
 
CHAIRPERSON REMUNERATION 
H0: CHAIR REMUNERATION IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO CEO COMPENSATION 
The chairperson’s remuneration as a predictor variable was included in the study to capture an 
element of the principal-agent dynamic. It was done on an exploratory basis rather than being 
rooted in literature.  
According to the standardised coefficient, 0.207, a positive relationship does indeed exist 
between CEO compensation and the remuneration of the chairperson. There is not much else one 
can glean from coefficient analysis therefore it is necessary to evaluate this hypothesis on the 
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basis of significance.  Next up we can have a look at the t-statistic which is regarded as 
insignificant if it falls outside the region of -1.96 and 1.96. The t-value attributed to chairperson 
remuneration, 1.438, is therefore not significant. Similarly, the p-value of 0.153 tells us that the 
remuneration of the chairperson is not a significant explanatory factor at the 5% level of 
significance. 
 
 
 
CHAIRPERSON FORMER CEO 
H0: IF THE CHAIRMAN HAS PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED THE POSITION OF CEO, CEO 
COMPENSATION WILL BE HIGHER 
 
According to the regression output, the relationship between the two variables is positive as 
denoted by the coefficient 0.121. It is however insignificant according to both the t-value,1.438 
,and a p-value of 0.320, meaning that the null hypothesis cannot be supported. 
 
CHAIRPERSON NATIONALITY 
H0:CEO COMPENSATION IS LOWER WHEN THE CHAIRPERSON IS SOUTH AFRICAN 
The coefficient points to a positive relationship between the Chairperson’s nationality and CEO 
Compensation, contrary to what was hypothesised.  
Even more revealing, is the corresponding t-value of 2.022. This value falls within the rejection 
region and based on this we can reject the null hypothesis.  
The p-value generated is 0.045 which is statistically significant meaning that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis. Therefore CEO Compensation is predicted to be higher under the chairmanship 
of a South African national. 
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CHAIRPERSON IS FOUNDER 
H0: WHEN CHAIRPERSON IS FOUNDER, CEO COMPENSATION IS LOWER 
The coefficient of this parameter is -0.157 which supports the notion of an inverse relationship. 
However, this relationship is not statistically significant. The p-value is 0.266 which is well 
above the significance level of 0.05. The t-value, which is calculated as -1.216, simultaneously 
confirms that the relationship is inverse and that it is insignificant. The null hypothesis is thus not 
supported. 
 
CHAIRPERSON IS EXECUTIVE 
H0: WHEN CHAIRPERSON IS EXECUTIVE, CEO COMPENSATION IS HIGHER 
We begin by exploring the directional relationship between the two variables by looking at the 
value of the coefficient. The value given is -0.388. This negative relationship suggests that the 
compensation of CEO’s will invariably be lower in cases where the chairperson occupies an 
executive function in the company. Of course, this result cannot be viewed in isolation. The p-
value reveals a statistically significant value of 0.011. The t-value corresponds with this 
assessment at a value of -2.592, which is in the rejection region. 
We therefore reject the null hypothesis at a significance level of 5%. 
 
BOARD SIZE 
H0: CEO COMPENSATION IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO BOARD SIZE  
The coefficient for board size is 0.283 which translates into a positive relationship as has been 
hypothesised. The corresponding t-value is 2.316 which lies outside the rejection region. The p-
value is 0.022 which is statistically significant. Based on this result, we can conclude that the 
size of the board does indeed have a significant positive relationship with CEO compensation at 
the 5% level. 
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PERCENTAGE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
H0: CEO COMPENSATION DECREASES AS THE PROPORTION OF INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTORS INCREASES 
Firstly, we observe that the value of the coefficient is -0.174. This confirms that, ceteris paribus, 
CEO compensation is inversely related to the proportion of independent directors. The t-value, -
1.825, while validating the inverse relationship does not indicate an adequate level of 
significance. The p-value is quite revealing too. At 0.070, the influence of independent 
directorships is regarded as insignificant at the 5% level. It is however very close and would be 
supported at the 10% level of significance, but rejected in the case of this study. 
 
PERCENTAGE OF FEMALE DIRECTORS 
H0: CEO COMPENSATION DECREASES AS THE PROPORTION OF FEMALE DIRECTORS 
INCREASES 
In the case of female representation on the board, it is evident that a negative relationship exists 
between the percentage of women on the board and the dependent variable. This is manifested in 
the coefficient statistic and the t-value, -0.155 and -1,627 respectively. The p-value is 0.106. 
These results are interpreted to be statistically insignificant at the 5% level of significance. Based 
on this model, the percentage of female directors has a negligible effect on CEO compensation. 
The null hypothesis is not supported in this case. 
 
PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNORS DIRECTORS 
H0: CEO COMPENSATION INCREASES AS THE PROPORTION OF FOREIGN DIRECTORS 
INCREASES 
On the basis of the regression values, there is a positive but insignificant relationship between the 
percentage of foreign directors and CEO compensation. The positive relationship is again given 
by the coefficient, 0.067. The evidence of significance, or lack thereof, is embedded in the p-
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value and t-value which yield figures of 0.593 and 0.536 respectively. The hypothesis is 
therefore not supported. 
 
PERCENTAGE OF BLACK DIRECTORS 
H0: CEO COMPENSATION DECREASES AS THE PROPORTION OF BLACK DIRECTORS 
INCREASES 
With a p-value of 0.686 and a t-value of -.405, the hypothesis that the proportion of black 
directors on the board has significant explanatory power cannot be supported. On a purely 
directional basis though, we do find that there is a negative relationship as given by the 
coefficient, -0.048. 
 
AVERAGE AGE OF BOARD 
H0: CEO COMPENSATION IS POSITEIVELY RELATED TO THE AVERAGE AGE OF THE 
BOARD 
According to the regression output, the coefficient of Board Age is 0.290 implying a positive 
relationship with CEO compensation. The p-value and t-value deem that this hypothesis is 
plausible at a significance level of 5%. The p-value is 0.008 which quite close to zero, indicating 
that this parameter has strong explanatory power. The t-value, 2.71, merely reaffirms this 
position since it lies within the rejection region of +/-1.96. 
 
NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN COMPENSATION COMMITTEE 
H0: CEO COMPENSATION IS INVERSELY RELATED TO PERCENTAGE OF NON-
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS IN THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE 
Consistent with the postulation of the hypothesis, we observe an inverse relationship between the 
dependent and independent variable, given by a coefficient statistic of -0.054. Statistically, the 
explanatory power of the independent variable is not significant at the 5% level. The p-value 
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stands at 0.563, which is well out of bounds while the t-value is -0.580. We can therefore not 
conclude that the percentage of Non-Executive Directors is significant in explaining variations in 
CEO Compensation. 
 
FOREIGN DIRECTORS IN COMPENSATION COMMITTEE 
H0: CEO COMPENSATION IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN 
DIRECTORS IN THE COMPENSATION COMMITTEE 
The coefficient for this parameter is 0.090 which is to be interpreted as having a positive 
relationship with CEO Compensation. In other words, the greater the percentage of Foreign 
Directors in the Compensation Committee, the higher will be CEO compensation. The answer to 
whether this relationship is significant or not is found in the t-value and p-value. A p-value of 
less than 0.05 is indicative of a significant relationship, and so too is a t-value lying outside the 
range of 1.96 and -1.96. For this particular model, we have a p-value of 0.426 which is 
insignificant according to the guidelines. The corresponding t-value is 0.80, indicating an 
absence of significance. Therefore, the hypothesis is not held up as statistically significant. 
 
RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) 
H0: CEO COMPENSATION IS POSITIVELY RELATED TO THE FIRM’S RETURN ON ASSETS 
The proxy for company performance, Return on Assets, does not yield a great degree of 
explanatory power according the regression output. While it does report a positive relationship 
between CEO Compensation, coefficient of 0.035, it does not stand up to the test of significance. 
With a p-value of 0.693 and a t-value of 0.396, ROA is statistically insignificant and therefore 
the hypothesis is not supported on this basis.  
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MARKET CAPITALIZATION (Firm Size) 
H0: CEO COMPENSATION IS POSITEIVELY RELATED TO THE SIZE OF THE FIRM 
Market Capitalization, the proxy used for Firm Size in this study, reports a coefficient statistic of 
0.248. It is therefore, as predicted, positively related to CEO Compensation. Moreover, it has a 
p-value of 0.018 – statistically significant. The t-value leads to the same conclusion with a 
reading of 2.40. This is of course within the region of significance. We can therefore state that 
they hypothesis that CEO Compensation is commensurate with Firm Size holds true at a 
significance level of 5%. 
 
5.2.4 Discussion of Results 
With no less that fifteen hypotheses tested, and an array of outcomes, the regression analysis was 
rather extensive. It is therefore fitting that the results be neatly summed up. Some of the 
outcomes were predictable, while others challenged conventional wisdom in the field of CEO 
Compensation.  
Board composition and diversity 
A very noticeable anomaly in the set of results is that pertaining to foreign directors. While 
theory on board matters postulates that an increase in foreign directors, especially those from 
Western societies, would invariably have an upward effect on CEO Compensation, our results 
present a different picture. The foreign director dimension has been incorporated twice in our 
analysis – As general members of the board; and as members of the compensation committee 
which is responsible for setting the CEO Compensation package. In both cases, we failed to 
observe any significant degree of extrapolative power with respect to CEO Compensation. It did 
however exhibit a positive relationship with CEO compensation as was expected, but again, not 
to any significant degree. This presents researchers with an opportunity to examine what 
influences this outcome in the South African context. One could look into the origin of the 
foreign directors, for example, if they are from other low-middle income economies where CEO 
Compensation is not as inflated as in The United States. Alternatively, it could be due to 
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established compensation level norms which offset the influence of foreign directors. These 
suggestions are, of course, not exhaustive and are subject to further research. 
From a South African standpoint, one of the more interesting exploratory questions of this 
research was to ascertain what effect institutional reform regarding gender and race would have 
on CEO Compensation, if any. We found both parameters to have a negative relationship with 
CEO Compensation albeit not at a statistically plausible level.  
When it comes to the age of the board we observe that older boards reward CEO’s more 
handsomely than their younger counterparts. This result was estimated to be of statistical 
significance. This may be explained by a higher degree of complacency or a reflection of how 
individual board members’ attitudes towards money develop with age. The implication here is 
that as one becomes older and more established, the more priority will be placed on financial 
security. This too is subject to further research. 
The only other measure of diversity and composition that had a significant influence on CEO 
Compensation was Board Size. As we observed in the preceding section, the relationship was 
positive and linear in nature. This result is intuitively appealing. One would expect that larger 
firms would require a larger governance structure, and by extension, a larger board. Large 
companies in turn generate higher revenues with which to reward the CEO.  
We also had the opportunity to explore what the consequences are, if any, in the event that the 
Chair of the Board is from abroad. The premise being that, with wielding so much influence at 
Board level, the Chair may advocate a higher compensation package as is practised in Western 
countries. Instead what we found is that the CEO is paid significantly less (at the 5% level) under 
the chairmanship of a foreigner. This result defies conventional theory and there is a need to 
study this phenomenon within a country-specific framework. 
Independence and Incentives          
A recurring theme in the field of corporate governance is that of the Principal-Agent problem, ie. 
the most effective and efficient manner of aligning interests in order to get the best out of the 
executive management team. The paper sought to assess, insofar as it was possible, the 
boardroom dynamics which suitably capture the Principal-Agent problem. The majority of this 
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section is dedicated to the nuances in the relationship between the CEO the Chairperson, because 
this is the traditional frame of reference on the topic.  
Based on the results, when the Chairperson is the founder of the firm but does not occupy an 
executive role, the compensation of the CEO is expected to be lower on average. It must be 
noted again that this downward sloping relationship is not significant enough to be a genuine 
explanatory variable. One can reasonably deduce that a possible explanation to the negative 
relationship is that a founding Chairman is more invested in the firm and would be less inclined 
to spending exorbitant amounts on the management team. Still this is open to interpretation. 
 
On the other hand, when the Chairman is occupies an executive role but is not the founder, we 
observe a significant decline in CEO Compensation. As a side note, we must take caution when 
interpreting this particular variable. Recall that in the correlation analysis, the Executive 
Chairman variable was characterised by a high degree of multicollinearity which impinges on the 
credibility as a predictor. Therefore, the reader must interpret this result with a healthy dose of 
suspicion.  
This paper also presented a useful opportunity to test whether there is a correlation between the 
compensation of the Chairperson and that of the CEO. I believe it captures the alignment of 
incentives dimension of the Principal-Agent problem in its most simplistic form. The test showed 
the relationship to be positive but not statistically significant. In a nutshell, the compensation of 
the CEO is expected to, ceteris paribus, increase simultaneously with the Chairperson’s. 
Then there is the case of the Chairperson being previously employed as the firm’s CEO. It is not 
atypical for a former CEO to be appointed as Chairperson and there were several cases of this 
phenomenon in the study. The data shows some evidence of a positive relationship between CEO 
pay and the status of the Chair as a former CEO. The significance of the relationship is however 
rather negligible. 
A substantial component of this paper, as is the case for most governance papers, is dedicated to 
the notion of independence. Independence of directors to carry out their assigned task of control 
and evaluation without any interference to be precise. I have posed the question: How does CEO 
Compensation respond to an influx of independent directors? The results show that the 
relationship is negative. This is encouraging as it gives one the impression that boards with 
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greater proportions of impartial members behave in a more fiscally responsible manner. As 
encouraging as this may be, as an explanatory factor it failed the test of significance. 
Analysis of CEO Compensation would be incomplete without making reference to the 
Remuneration/Compensation Committee. This is after all the think tank tasked with structuring 
the CEO’s compensation package. The composition of this sub-committee is thus of importance. 
The norm is for the committee to consist entirely of Non-Executive directors as part of good 
governance practice. This rule is not always enforced, and because of that, I was able to make 
extrapolations about the influence of Non-Executive directors on CEO pay. The results reveal 
that a higher percentage of Non-Executive directors in the compensation committee translates 
into less reward for the CEO. But it too failed the test of significance. 
 
 
Performance 
The performance of the firm is typically included in the assessment of CEO Compensation. The 
proxy for performance used differs amongst scholars. I opted for Return on Assets (ROA), as 
used by Bøhren & Strøm (2010) in their study of governance and politics. The logic here is that a 
CEO is rewarded, to some extent, according to the performance of the firm under his watch. This 
is why a traditional component of CEO Compensation is performance-based. The relationship 
between these two components was found to be positive but not to a significant degree. 
My second proxy for performance is based on the size of the firm, but unlike ROA, is not 
directly related to the performance of the CEO. I opted to present the size of the firm in terms of 
its market capitalisation, which is the product of the number of shares in issue and the market 
value of the share. It goes without saying that large firms, such as multinational corporations, 
will have substantially higher market capitalisation than medium-sized firms. To adjust for this 
discrepancy, I have instead used the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (LnMarketCap) to 
provide a more balanced assessment. This relationship was found to be statistically significant in 
a positive direction. What this says is simple: The larger the firm, the higher will be CEO 
Compensation, all else being equal.   
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Determinants of CEO Compensation In South Africa 
Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion 
6.1 SUMMARY 
At the outset of this paper, the research question was framed as follows: Which variables 
significantly affect the level of CEO Compensation? Of the 15 variables proposed, only 4 were 
able to survive the rigorous battery of tests. Those variables are summed up as follows: 
 The age of the board 
 
- CEO Compensation is predicted to be higher as board age increases 
 
 The size of the firm 
 
- CEO Compensation rises as firm size increases 
 
 The nationality of the Chairperson 
 
- CEO Compensation is higher is cases where the Chair is South African 
 
 Whether the Chairperson is an executive 
 
- CEO Compensation is predicted to be lower in the event that the Chair is executive 
 
The most conspicuous of these results is the assertion that CEO pay is higher when the 
Chairperson of the board is local. Theoretically, the opposite should be true. This may suggest 
that the South African business environment has unique factors which nullify the traditional 
proposition. Determining why this is the case is a potential area of future research. 
As for the status of the Chairperson being executive or not, while being statistically significant, 
was determined to have substantial multicollinearity. The predictive power of the parameter was 
therefore compromised and so should not be used for further extrapolation. Instead, future 
models must include an interaction term to take into account the correlations among independent 
variables. 
 
The body of literature regarding CEO Compensation in South Africa as a factor of boardroom 
dynamics is somewhat limited, giving this country-specific project a somewhat exploratory 
flavour. Nevertheless, I hope to have made a useful contribution to the field of CEO pay studies 
at large. South Africa does, after all, enjoy the status of an emerging market and any information 
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pertaining to its corporate dynamics will assist stakeholders in understanding how things are 
done in the country. 
 
The model itself explains under half of all variations in CEO Compensation, which implies that 
there is still a treasure chest of discoveries to be made in determining what causes its 
fluctuations. I would encourage researchers to delve deeper into this matter so that a more robust 
model may be created. 
6.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The limitations of this thesis have by and large been driven by time constraints in the data 
collection process. In a project of this nature and theme, one would ideally want a sample size as 
close to the population size as possible. It was not possible in the case of this thesis, where the 
sample is representative of about 10% of the sample frame. I attempted to make the sample as 
representative of the population as possible by incorporating firms from a wide cross-section of 
industries, while giving due recognition to the large listing presence of mining sector on the 
stock exchange. It is not a watertight solution and so does leave open the possibility of ‘’noise’’ 
or distortions.   
6.3 CHALLENGES 
In hindsight, I must concede that embarking on a research project of this scale was rather 
ambitious given the time constraints. The lion’s share of the project’s duration was dedicated to 
collecting and organising data. The source of the data came in the form on annual reports in 
electronic format. Navigating the trove of documents in the quest for the few needles in the 
haystack proved to be an agonising and painstaking process. Bear in mind that the presentation 
format of annual reports is not homogeneous from one company to the next, or even from year to 
year. There were also several cases where the annual reports did not provide all the data 
necessary to complete the model, resulting in numerous instances of missing data. While the 
premise of this task was that it be carried out in a bipartisan fashion, the reality was to the 
contrary. Any potential benefits of synergy were ultimately lost.  
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